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Notes
APPLYING THE PRIVATE BENEFIT
DOCTRINE TO FARMLAND CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS
PAIGE MADELINE GENTRY†
ABSTRACT
Farmland or working-land conservation easements serve two
purposes. One is charitable, to protect open space from development;
the other is practical, to preserve the land in productive agricultural
use. These purposes, however, create a tension in the easement itself
that can force the land trust that holds the easement to choose between
the two purposes when the easement, meant in part to protect the
farm, threatens the farm’s continued viability.
Neutral-impact amendments are amendments to working-land
easements that allow farmers to improve farm production or viability
without harming the conservation value of the easements. Such
amendments seem beneficial: a land trust can advance one of its goals
of keeping agricultural land productive–without sacrificing the other
goal of preserving the conservation value of the land. By approving
such an amendment, however, a land trust likely violates the private
benefit doctrine and risks losing its tax-exempt status. This Note
argues that the IRS should explicitly decide not to apply the private
benefit doctrine to neutral-impact amendments of farmland and
working-land conservation easements.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine this scenario: many years ago, a farmer, fearing that his
lands might be turned into strip malls or housing subdivisions,
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decided to conserve his farmland. Working with a conservation land
trust, he protected his land through a conservation easement. The
conservation easement allowed the farmer to continue farming the
land, but it limited any future development of the land to ensure that
the land would remain farmed in perpetuity. Today, the farmer is
struggling—he has had a bad crop year and is worried about his
income. A utility company approaches the farmer, asking to lease
space inside the farmer’s silo. The utility company wants to place its
antennas inside the silo, removing the need to build cellular towers
along nearby ridges. For both parties, this lease seems like the perfect
opportunity—the farmer gains rental income and financial stability,
and the utility company finds a place for its antennas while still
protecting open space and scenic views.
Unfortunately, the terms of the conservation easement prohibit
new development on the farm. These terms seem to prohibit the
antennas, thus necessitating an amendment to the original easement.
To both the land trust and the farmer, the amendment seems like a
good idea. The amendment would allow the land trust to balance two
different goals: the underlying conservation value of the land remains
protected, and the extra income ensures that the farmer can continue
the farming operation. To all sides, this arrangement seems like a nobrainer, until the parties examine tax law.
2
Under the private benefit doctrine, tax-exempt organizations
cannot confer a nonincidental benefit on private individuals or
3
organizations. A tax-exempt organization that does confer such a
nonincidental benefit runs the risk of losing its federal tax-exempt
4
status. If the land trust amends its conservation easement covering
the farmer’s land, the IRS might find that the land trust conferred a
primary private benefit to the farmer (the rental fees from the
antennas inside the silo) and a secondary private benefit to the utility

1. This hypothetical is derived from Darby Bradley, Amending Perpetual Conservation
Easements: Confronting the Dilemmas of Change: A Practitioner’s View 27 (Dec. 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vlt.org/images/0_Temporary/Bradley_
Amendments.pdf.
2. For the purposes of this Note, the phrase tax-exempt organization refers to groups that
receive tax-exempt status as a charitable organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
3. Andrew Megosh, Lary Scollick, Mary Jo Salins & Cheryl Chasin, Private Benefit Under
IRC 501(c)(3), in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS: IRS TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 137, 138 (2000).
4. E.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 1 (Nov. 22, 1991).
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company (the ability to install the antennas cheaply). Under this
reasoning, the amendment confers a nonincidental benefit to private
interests, and the land trust could lose its tax-exempt status.
Because land trusts risk losing their tax-exempt status after a
6
single violation of the private benefit doctrine, it is important for
land trusts to understand how to apply the doctrine and work within
it. Although on its face the private benefit doctrine seems to be
simple—tax-exempt organizations cannot confer a substantial benefit
to noncharitable individuals or organizations—no one, not even the
7
Internal Revenue Service (IRS), applies it consistently. It can be
quite challenging for a land trust to conform its activities to a doctrine
that lacks clear or predictable guidelines.
Amendments to farmland conservation easements can create
significant difficulties for land trusts trying to navigate both their
charitable requirements and the needs of farmers. Farmland
8
conservation easements, and working-land easements generally, are
specifically designed to conserve farmland while allowing the
9
landowner to continue farming the land. These easements serve two
purposes. The primary purpose is to protect land from development
10
for the greater public good, and the secondary purpose is to preserve

5. See infra Part III.A. Primary benefits are benefits that a tax-exempt organization
confers directly on a noncharitable recipient. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
Secondary benefits are benefits indirectly received by a noncharitable recipient. See infra note
89 and accompanying text.
6. Cf., e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 1 (discussing the case of a hospital that
"jeopardized its exempt status" because of problems with the private benefit doctrine).
7. See John D. Colombo, Private Benefit: What Is It—And What Do We Want It To Be?
2 (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (“[N]either the courts
nor IRS personnel know what ‘private benefit’ means, and . . . there is no coherent doctrinal
definition of the concept.”).
8. This Note uses farmland conservation easement and working-land conservation
easement interchangeably, although working-land easements are a broader category of
conservation easements, encompassing easements on forested lands and ranchlands, as well as
on farmland.
9. Judy Anderson & Jerry Cosgrove, Agricultural Easements: Allowing a Working
Landscape To Work, EXCHANGE (Land Trust Alliance, Wash., D.C.), Fall 1998, at 9, 9.
10. See, e.g., EXHIBIT B: GRANT OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, CONSERVATION
RESTRICTIONS, OPTION TO PURCHASE AT AGRICULTURAL VALUE, AND CONTINGENT RIGHT
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 1, cl. 2 (2006), available at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/
documents/31319/Exhibit_B_Vermont.pdf (noting that the purposes of granting development
rights are “to conserve scenic and natural resources associated with the Protected Property, to
improve the quality of life for Vermonters, and to maintain for the benefit of future generations
the essential characteristics of the Vermont countryside.”).
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the land in productive agricultural use. These dual purposes,
however, create a tension in the easement: conservation easements
protect the land from development in perpetuity, but land
preservation sometimes conflicts with the needs of a productive farm,
particularly as both land- and farm-management practices and
12
technologies change over time. A farmer’s ability to adapt to
changing technologies and farming methods may be limited by the
terms of the conservation easement.
Although standard easement-amendment procedures prohibit a
land trust from approving an amendment that creates a substantial
13
private benefit for a private party, there is very little discussion of
the private benefit doctrine and its application to conservation
easement amendments in practitioner and industry publications or
14
legal scholarship. In part, this is because the IRS, until recently, had
rarely used the doctrine in relation to conservation land trusts. In
March 2011, however, the IRS revoked a land trust’s charitable status
in part because the land trust violated the private benefit doctrine by
approving several amendments that negatively impacted the

11. See, e.g., id. § 1, cl. 1 (“[T]he primary purpose of this Grant is to conserve productive
agricultural and forestry lands and soil resources in order to facilitate active and economically
viable farm use of the Protected Property now and in the future.”).
12. Duncan M. Greene, Comment, Dynamic Conservation Easements: Facing the Problem
of Perpetuity in Land Conservation, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 883, 884–85 (2005).
13. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, AMENDING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS: EVOLVING
PRACTICES AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES 17 (2007), available at http://learningcenter.lta.org/
attached-files/0/65/6534/Amendment_Report_Final_web.pdf.
14. See id. at 25–26 (recommending that land trusts undertake a private benefit analysis of
their activities but providing only one example of a private benefit and no other guidance);
LESLIE RATLEY-BEACH, MANAGING CONSERVATION EASEMENTS IN PERPETUITY 162–63
(Sylvia Bates ed., 2009), available at http://learningcenter.lta.org/attached-files/0/95/9569/
DL_Managing_CE_05062010_lores.pdf (noting that land trusts “should scrutinize every
conservation easement amendment proposal” for violations of the private benefit doctrine and
briefly outlining the rules of the doctrine); Chris Cline, Inurement and Private Benefit:
Avoidable Perils, in THE BACK FORTY ANTHOLOGY: SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE
NEWSLETTER OF LAND CONSERVATION LAW (William T. Hutton, Darrin S. Brown, Lisa M.
Burkdall, Ellen A. Fred, Audra M. Mai & Erika M. Muhl eds., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing the
private benefit doctrine and its implications for land trusts without applying it to conservationeasement amendments); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8
WYO. L. REV. 25, 52–54 (2008) (discussing the general rules of the private benefit doctrine and
noting that it is not often used); Bill Silberstein & Jessica Jay, Staying Within the Bounds of the
Income Tax Code and Public Perception: Private Inurement and Private Benefit, EXCHANGE,
(Land Trust Alliance, Wash., D.C.), Spring 1999 (discussing the concepts of private inurement
and private benefit).
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15

conservation value of the land. To make matters worse, the IRS and
Congress have increased their scrutiny of land trusts, reviewing both
the charitable purpose of land trusts and the validity of the charitable
16
deductions received by donors of land. Viewed together, the recent
revocation of a land trust’s tax-exempt status and the increased
scrutiny of land trusts leave these organizations in a difficult place.
They must be able to ensure that their policies do not violate a
doctrine that has incoherent and inconsistent application by the IRS.
Remedying this disconcerting situation requires a shift in the current
understanding of the private benefit doctrine and, in particular, its
application to neutral-impact amendments. Neutral-impact
amendments, such as an amendment allowing a farmer to lease space
inside his silo, are amendments that allow land trusts to balance the
dual purposes of their working-land easements. A neutral-impact
amendment does not negatively impact the conservation value of the
land protected by an easement, thus preserving the easement’s
charitable purpose. But such an amendment does change the
language of the easement to aid the farmer, thus allowing a land trust
to help keep the covered land in productive use. Yet, by approving a
neutral-impact amendment, a land trust runs the risk of losing its taxexempt status.
This Note argues that the IRS should not apply the private
benefit doctrine to neutral-impact amendments to conservation
easements. By helping preserve the working landscape without
reducing the land’s conservation value, neutral-impact amendments
actually serve the charitable purposes of land trusts. Instead, the
private benefit doctrine should only be applied to amendments that
abuse the nonprofit form, such as those that reduce the conservation
value of the land.
Part I addresses the basis of a land trust’s charitable status, the
structure of conservation easements, and how amendments to
15. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 26–27 (Mar. 11, 2011). The IRS also found that the
land trust had violated the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test and the private inurement
doctrine. Id.
16. See C. TIMOTHY LINDSTROM, A TAX GUIDE TO CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 11–12
(2008) (“[T]he IRS has dramatically increased its scrutiny of conservation transactions . . . . The
days of benign neglect of conservation transactions by the government appear to be over.”);
Jason A. Richardson, Increased Scrutiny on Conservation Easement Donations: How a
Crackdown on Tax Fraud by the IRS Could Impact Environmental Protection, 1 ENVTL. &
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 273, 273 (2006) (“In order to close the loophole that allowed for . . . tax
fraud[,] the Internal Revenue Service . . . has increased its scrutiny of claims for these
deductions.”).
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easements put land trusts at risk of losing their tax-exempt status.
Part II examines the private benefit doctrine. It notes the difficulties
with the doctrine, outlines the basic tenets of the doctrine, and
discusses the three main tests used to interpret and apply it. Part III
applies these theories to neutral-impact amendments and finds that
they likely violate the letter of the private benefit doctrine, even
though the amendments do not negatively affect the conservation
value of the land. Part IV argues that the private benefit doctrine
should not apply to neutral-impact amendments because they do not
violate the doctrine’s spirit. At its core, the private benefit doctrine is
an anti-abuse doctrine, designed to protect the government from
subsidizing noncharitable endeavors. Neutral-impact amendments do
not abuse the tax-exempt form. Instead, they seek to give equal
weight to the dual purposes of a working-land easement, purposes
that the IRS has already sanctioned.
I. THE CHARITABLE STATUS OF CONSERVATION LAND TRUSTS
AND THE STRUCTURE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
Conservation land trusts are private, tax-exempt organizations
17
with a mission to preserve land and protect it from development.
Land trusts conserve land through a variety of methods, including
deed restrictions, outright purchase, and the purchase or acceptance
18
of donated conservation easements. Of these three options, land
19
trusts most commonly use conservation easements to preserve land.
A conservation easement is a legal agreement that protects the
conservation value of a particular property by restricting future
20
development in perpetuity. Land trusts use conservation easements
to protect a variety of properties, including forests, wetlands, beaches,
historical buildings, gardens, wildlife properties, ranches, and
21
farmland. Under a conservation easement, the landowner retains the
ownership and certain rights of use of the land, but other uses are
22
restricted. For example, easements typically limit or prohibit new
17. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, FACT SHEET: WHAT IS A LAND TRUST? 1 (2008), available at
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/documents/what-is-land-trust.pdf.
18. Id. at 1–2.
19. Id. at 1.
20. ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT
HANDBOOK 14 (2d ed. 2005).
21. Id. at 17; C. Timothy Lindstrom, Income Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5
WYO. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005).
22. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 17.
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development but grandfather in existing development. If the
landowner sells land with a conservation easement in place, the
24
restrictions remain with the property.
Conservation easements can be donated or sold to either a
government entity or a conservation land trust that holds the
25
easement in perpetuity. A landowner who donates a conservation
easement can receive a charitable deduction for the value of the
26
easement under § 170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). As
the holder of a conservation easement, a land trust has the right and
27
the obligation to enforce the terms of the easement. Land trusts
must monitor the land to ensure that the landowner has not violated
28
the terms of the easement and may remedy violations if necessary.
The land trust is thus responsible for ensuring that the underlying
environmental and conservation value of the easement remains intact
over time.
A land trust drafts its easements and enforces those easements’
restrictions to remain consistent with its charitable purpose. This Part
outlines the basis for a land trust’s tax-exempt status, noting that the
IRS does not consider farmland preservation alone to be a charitable
purpose. This Part then highlights the relevant structures of a
conservation easement that allow a land trust to meet its mission,
focusing on amendment approval as an activity that puts a land trust
at risk of losing its tax-exempt status.

23. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–13.
24. Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 6.
25. Id. at 5.
26. See I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(3)(B), (h) (2006). The value of an easement is determined by
subtracting the fair market value of the land with development restrictions from the fair market
value of the land without the restrictions. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3) (2003).
27. See Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 5 (noting that an obligation exists “if the donation of
an easement is to qualify for federal tax benefits”).
28. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 25 (Mar. 11, 2011) (“[A] qualified organization
must be committed to protecting the conservation purposes of the donation and it must have the
resources to enforce the restrictions. Furthermore, a qualified organization must be committed
to protecting conservation easement contributions in perpetuity.”); RATLEY-BEACH, supra note
14, at 14 (“Good relationships with landowners, thorough baseline documentation reports,
regular (at least annual) easement monitoring visits and sound recordkeeping systems are the
foundation of your land trust’s land protection efforts and fundamental to upholding its
obligations.”).
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A. Charitable Purpose of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements
Under Federal Law
To gain and maintain tax-exempt status, a land trust’s purpose
and activities must meet one of the definitions of “charitable” under
IRS rules. Although the language of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) does not
mention land conservation, land trusts qualify for tax-exempt status if
they have a charitable purpose of preserving and protecting “the
29
natural environment for the benefit of the public.”
Because the IRS does not consider the preservation of farmland
to be a charitable purpose, land trusts cannot have farmland
30
preservation as their sole purpose. Instead, land trusts can qualify
for tax-exempt status if they preserve “ecologically significant”
31
farmland. The IRS views preserving ecologically significant farmland
as a valid charitable purpose because doing so provides a significant
public benefit and follows an “express national policy of conserving
32
the nation’s unique national resources.” Alternatively, a land trust
can have a charitable purpose, and thus tax-exempt status, if its
farmland-conservation activities provide certain educational or
33
scientific value.
Although I.R.C. § 170(h) sets forth the conditions under which a
conservation easement qualifies as a charitable deduction for
34
donors, the IRS and land trusts also use § 170(h) as a guideline to
35
determine if a land trust itself qualifies as a tax-exempt organization.

29. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,055, at 3 (Nov. 7, 1983).
30. Rev. Rul. 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174.
31. Rev. Rul. 76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152, 153.
32. Id.
33. See Dumaine Farms v. Comm’r, 73 T.C. 650, 653, 667–68 (1980) (holding that an
experimental farm that did not have any ecologically significant attributes qualified for taxexempt status because it conducted scientific and educational activities), action on dec., 1980-45
(Feb. 11, 1980).
34. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006).
35. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 23 (Mar. 11, 2011) (“The legislative history of
section 170(h) indicates that Congress intended for the requirements of deductibility under
I.R.C. § 170(h) to be compatible with the requirements for exemption under section 501(c)(3).
Thus, there is strong support for the conclusion that conservation purposes under section
170(h)(4)(A) may be considered exempt purposes under section 501(c)(3).”); I.R.S. Gen.
Couns. Mem. 39,055, at 5 (Nov. 7, 1983) (“[T]he Trust considered herein does not meet the
present standards for exemption for conservation organizations discussed in [Revenue Ruling
76-204, 1976-1 C.B. 152, and Revenue Ruling 78-384, 1978-2 C.B. 174,] nor the broader
standards set out in section 170(h).”); William T. Hutton, Agricultural Preservation: A Model
Letter for Protesting Denial of Tax-Exempt Status, in THE BACK FORTY ANTHOLOGY, supra
note 14, at 1.13 (noting that although the IRS grounds its denials of exemption in Revenue
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Under § 170(h), a conservation easement is a “qualified conservation
contribution” when the donor contributes qualified real property to a
qualified organization, such as a land trust, to be used exclusively for
36
conservation purposes. Valid conservation purposes under § 170(h)
include preserving land for outdoor recreation, protecting natural
37
habitats, preserving open space, and preserving historic sites. By
extension, these conservation purposes are considered tax-exempt
38
purposes for the land trust under § 501(c)(3). Additionally, the
39
conserved land must be protected in perpetuity. For a land trust to
demonstrate that it has met this requirement, it must have
appropriate policies and sufficient resources to assure the IRS that
the land trust will be able to protect the conserved land in
40
perpetuity.
Farmland easements typically qualify for charitable status under
41
the open-space requirement. To meet this requirement, the land
must be preserved either “for the scenic enjoyment of the general
public” or “pursuant to a clearly delineated Federal, State, or local
governmental conservation policy” and have a significant public
42
benefit. Land trusts most frequently qualify their farmland
43
conservation easements as charitable under the latter requirement.
Ruling 78-384, it has reversed its position when land trusts have argued for tax-exempt status
under § 170(h)).
36. I.R.C. § 170(h)(1).
37. Id. § 170(h)(4)(A).
38. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020.
39. I.R.C. § 170(h)(5)(A).
40. Cf. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 23–26 (revoking a land trust’s tax-exempt status
in part because it had insufficient financial resources and monitoring policies to protect the land
that it was charged with protecting in perpetuity).
41. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(A)(iii).
42. Id.
43. LINDSTROM, supra note 16, at 47. To meet the test for a clearly delineated
governmental policy, the policy in question must be more than just a general declaration that
the state or local government supports conservation. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iii)(A)
(2003). Instead, there should be a “specific, identified conservation project” or conservation
plan within which the protected land fits. Id. The government entity must also be fully
committed to the conservation program and can demonstrate its commitment through the use of
preferential tax assessments or preferential zoning. Id. For example, a generalized agricultural
zoning policy combined with a comprehensive plan designating some land as available for
farming is likely too general to meet the requirement for a clearly delineated governmental
policy. See LINDSTROM, supra note 16, at 47–48 (“In this case, the deduction would appear
vulnerable because of the generalized nature of the governmental policies on which the
easement relied.”). A combination of planning policies, zoning, and preferential tax treatment
for agricultural areas, however, might be enough to satisfy the requirement. Id. at 48. The
preserved land must also create a significant public benefit, defined in the regulations by eleven
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B. The Structure of Farmland Conservation Easements
Because the preservation of farmland alone does not qualify as a
charitable purpose, farmland conservation easements have dual
purposes and a structure that reflects those purposes. Farmland
conservation easements are written to ensure compliance with IRS
guidelines for tax-exempt organizations and to keep the farmland in
production. This duality creates an inherent tension within the
easement itself—the goal of land preservation will sometimes conflict
with the goal of maintaining productive farmland. Because of this
tension, there will be instances in which the farmland conservation
easement limits the ability of the farmer to keep the land in
production. The conservation goals will always trump the
agricultural-production goals because the land trust relies on the
conservation goals for its tax-exempt status, and the easement donor
relies on the preservation goals to retain his or her charitable
deduction.
Farmland conservation easements do not explicitly acknowledge
this tension, but they are structured to address these dual purposes.
Four aspects of farmland conservation easements are relevant for this
Note: (1) the purpose statement and recitals, (2) the restrictions and
reserved rights, (3) the definition of agriculture, and (4) the
administrative provisions, specifically the provisions on how to amend
44
a conservation easement.
1. The Purpose Statement and Recitals. A farmland conservation
easement’s purpose-statement and recitals clauses include at least two
purposes. One is conservation-oriented and thus charitable; the other
focuses on preserving existing productive uses and is thus not
45
inherently charitable. To ensure that the land trust is meeting its
charitable requirements, one purpose statement will closely adhere to
46
the IRS conservation purposes test. For example, a purpose
statement might include a reference to the protection of scenic and

different factors, including the uniqueness of the property and the importance of the property in
its ability to attract tourism or commerce. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(iv).
44. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 302–07.
45. See, e.g., supra notes 10–11.
46. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 313; see also Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 14 (“In
drafting a conservation easement it makes sense to include a description of the conservation
purpose(s) of the conservation easement in terms that replicate the description of conservation
purposes recognized by the Regulations.”).
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47

open space or to the preservation of prime or unique soils. A second
purpose statement will address the need to conserve particular
48
productive agricultural lands. These two purposes demonstrate a
land trust’s commitment to achieving its charitable goals while
remaining mindful of the need to preserve productive agricultural
lands.
2. Restrictions and Reserved Rights. The section on restrictions
and reserved rights must clearly state the restrictions on the land and
49
the rights that remain with the landowner. In a farmland
conservation easement, this section is designed to strike a balance
between the conservation purposes of the easement and the
50
landowner’s farming operation. Common restrictions on farmland
conservation easements include limits or prohibitions on subdivisions,
51
new development, and new land uses. These restrictions allow the
land trust to achieve its charitable purpose to preserve land from
further development.
To meet the second purpose of keeping farmland in production,
a farmland conservation easement reserves several rights to the
farmer, including the right to farm the land and the right to a
52
farmstead complex. A farmstead complex reserves several acres of
land on which the landowner can build and maintain farm structures
53
without requesting permission from the land trust. Additional rights
often reserved to the farmer include the right to develop a specific
54
site in the future, particularly for farm-support housing, and the right

47. See BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 313 (including “Other Open-Space Types” such
as agriculture and forestry).
48. See supra note 11.
49. BYERS & PONTE, supra note 20, at 322–69.
50. See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text.
51. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–13.
52. E.g., EXHIBIT B: GRANT OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS,
OPTION TO PURCHASE AT AGRICULTURAL VALUE, AND CONTINGENT RIGHT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 10, § 3, cl. 6.
53. See, e.g., AGRICULTURAL CONSERVATION EASEMENT § 8(c) (2002), available at http://
www.farmlandinfo.org/documents/37237/Macedon_NY_Easement.pdf (“New buildings and
other structures and improvements to be used primarily for agricultural purposes may be built
on the Property within the Farmstead Area. New agricultural buildings, structures or
improvements proposed for locations outside the Farmstead Area may be built only with the
permission of the Grantee.”).
54. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 13; see also EXHIBIT B: GRANT OF
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS, CONSERVATION RESTRICTIONS, OPTION TO PURCHASE AT
AGRICULTURAL VALUE, AND CONTINGENT RIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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to utilize new technology on the farm even if it was not specifically
55
named in the easement.
3. Definition of Agriculture. Farmland conservation easements
also often tie the definitions of agriculture and agricultural practices
56
to federal or state standards. This linkage gives the farmer and the
land trust the ability to adapt to changing agricultural practices
57
without violating the terms of the easement.
4. Amendments. Despite the flexibility written into easements,
the conservation land trusts that draft farmland conservation
easements cannot contemplate every change in agricultural
58
technology, land use, or land preservation. Thus conservation
easements frequently include a clause that allows the land trust to
59
amend the easement upon the request of the landowner. The right to
amend the easement gives both the easement holder and the
landowner some flexibility to adjust to changed or changing
60
conditions.

supra note 10, § 3, cl. 8 (“The right to construct . . . and use one (1) farm labor housing unit
(‘FLH’), together with appurtenant non-residential structures and improvements, including
drives and utilities, normally associated with a residence; provided, however, that the FLH shall
be (a) occupied by Grantor or at least one person who is a member of Grantor’s family or who
is employed on the farm, and (b) located in the area depicted as ‘FLH Site’ on the . . . Farm
Plan.” (emphasis omitted)).
55. Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–12.
56. Id. at 10–11.
57. See id. (“These standards are flexible; often defined within state or federal
programs . . . that are updated periodically to reflect changes in agricultural practices. By
utilizing state-defined or federal standards, the easement grantee may avoid difficult discussions
with farmers as to ‘who best knows’ how to farm.”).
58. See LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 9 (“The occasional need to amend an
easement is rooted in our inability to predict all the circumstances that may arise in the
future.”); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 470 (2005) (“[T]he need to make modifications and adjustments to
account for changed conditions and societal needs may become acute.”).
59. McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 444.
60. There is some debate in the land trust community as to whether conservation
easements should be amendable and, if so, how they should be amended. This Note assumes
that for some land trusts, amendments are inescapable, and these debates are not relevant for
the purposes of this Note. See generally id. (advocating the application of the charitable-trust
doctrine in conservation easements); Andrew C. Dana, Conservation Easement Amendments:
A View from the Field (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
learningcenter.lta.org/attached-files/0/57/5754/CE_Amendments-View_from_Field_(ADana_55-06).pdf (outlining “[l]egal problems with broad application of charitable trust rules” to
conservation easements).
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Because amendments change an easement that is meant to
protect land in perpetuity, land trusts must be careful to ensure that a
proposed amendment does not undermine the conservation purposes
61
of the easement. To ensure that conservation land trusts carefully
analyze any amendment proposal that they receive, the Land Trust
Alliance (LTA), an umbrella organization and land trust accreditor
and resource center, gives guidance on how to structure amendments
62
and amendment procedures. The LTA developed seven principles to
guide land trusts through an amendment-approval process. To
approve an amendment using these principles, a land trust must show
that the amendment:
1. Clearly serve[s] the public interest and [is] consistent with the
land trust’s mission.
2. Compl[ies] with all applicable federal, state and local laws.
3. [Does not] jeopardize the land trust’s tax-exempt status or status
as a charitable organization under federal or state law.
4. [Does not] result in private inurement or confer impermissible
private benefit.
5. [Is] consistent with the conservation purpose(s) and intent of the
easement.
6. [Is] consistent with the documented intent of the donor, grantor
and any direct funding source.

61. See Dana, supra note 60, at 3 (“[T]he tension between (a) land trusts’ conservation
easement stewardship responsibilities to protect and preserve, in perpetuity, a complement of
conservation values for the benefit of the public, and (b) changing social demands and values,
poses perhaps the most difficult challenge that the private land conservation community has
faced to date.”).
62. See Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation
Easements: A Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“The Land Trust
Alliance is a nonprofit umbrella organization that provides training and education to, and
develops policies and standards for, the over 1,700 local, state, and regional land trusts operating
in the United States.”). Many of the LTA’s reports and policies are developed by legal scholars
and its materials are widely cited, including by Professor Nancy McLaughlin and Timothy
Lindstrom. See, e.g., LINDSTROM, supra note 16, at 38; Lindstrom, supra note 14, at 26;
Lindstrom, supra note 21, at 4; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Amending Perpetual Conservation
Easements: A Case Study of the Myrtle Grove Controversy, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 1031, 1060
(2006); McLaughlin & Weeks, supra, at 9; McLaughlin, supra note 58, at 423. Additionally, the
LTA has been cited in one case on conservation easements. See Whitehouse Hotel L.P. v.
Comm’r, 615 F.3d 321, 329 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing LAND TRUST ALLIANCE & NATIONAL TRUST
FOR HISTORICAL PRESERVATION, APPRAISING EASEMENTS (3d. ed. 1999), to illustrate the
complicated nature of easement appraisals).
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7. Ha[s] a net beneficial or neutral effect on the relevant
63
conservation values protected by the easement.

These principles are designed to ensure that the land trust and its
amended easement remain true to its charitable purpose and do not
violate any relevant laws.
C. Land Trusts and Amendments
To maintain its charitable status, a land trust must always work
to further its mission. It is particularly important for land trusts to
keep their mission in the forefront during the amendment-approval
process. The seven principles listed in the previous subsection are all
different ways of asking the same question: Is the amendment
consistent with the charitable purposes of the easement? Or, in other
words, does the amendment protect or improve the conservation
value furthered by the easement?
Amendment proposals can be grouped into three different types
64
based on this question. The first group includes amendments that
have positive conservation impacts. For example, a land trust might
approve an amendment that protects more land under the easement
than what was originally protected. By protecting more land, these
amendments further the land trust’s charitable mission. Conversely,
land trusts should not approve the second group of amendments—
those that remove restrictions on development. Amendments with
negative conservation impacts work directly against the land trust’s
charitable mission of preserving land. In both instances, it is relatively
clear whether a land trust would advance or undermine its charitable
purpose by approving an amendment.
This analysis becomes more complicated with a third group of
amendments that have—in the words of the LTA’s standard—
65
“neutral effect[s].” Neutral-impact amendments typically allow a
farmer to add facilities or technologies that improve the viability or
63. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 13, at 17.
64. These groupings are based on work by Professor McLaughlin and the LTA. See id. at
78 (using a matrix to highlight the positive and negative conservation impacts of proposed
easements); McLaughlin, supra note 62, at 1076 (“Although courts traditionally have been
reluctant to find that a trustee has powers not expressly granted in the gift or trust instrument
(hence the desirability of including an express amendment provision in conservation easement
deeds), interpreting conservation easements as granting the holders the implied power to make
clearly neutral or enhancing amendments would be consistent with the goals of the charitable
trust rules.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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productivity of the farm with no impact on the conservation value of
66
the easement. Take, for example, a proposal for an amendment to
increase and modernize a farmstead complex by ten acres in return
for conserving ten additional acres with an equivalent conservation
67
value. The amendment has a neutral conservation impact because it
neither decreases nor increases the conservation value of the land. In
essence, a neutral-impact amendment allows the land trust to strike a
difficult balance—it protects the underlying conservation value of the
land and supports the additional goal of keeping farmland in
production. In this light, a neutral-impact amendment seems like a
win-win. Yet, surprisingly, if a land trust were to approve a neutralimpact amendment, it would run the risk of violating the private
benefit doctrine and losing its charitable status.
II. THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE
Under the private benefit doctrine, if the IRS finds that a taxexempt organization conferred a substantial private benefit on
68
another party, the organization’s tax-exempt status will be revoked.
A private benefit is any benefit conferred on a disinterested
69
individual or organization that serves a private rather than a
70
charitable or public interest. On its face, this principle is clear, but
71
the application of the doctrine is quite difficult. One scholar has
72
described the doctrine as simply a “mess.” The messiness of the
doctrine stems from two main issues. First, the private benefit
doctrine is not directly codified in a statute but instead originates in
IRS regulations. Second, the doctrine has an unclear purpose and

66. See infra Part III.
67. See infra Part III.B.
68. See Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 139 (“[I]f private interests are served other than
incidentally, exemption is precluded.”).
69. In the private benefit context, disinterested individuals and organizations include
anyone who receives benefits from the tax-exempt organization other than the intended
recipients of the charitable activity. Id. at 139.
70. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1068–69 (1989).
71. See John D. Colombo, In Search of Private Benefit, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2006)
(“This is a quintessential balancing test under which the IRS both owns and reads the
scale . . . . [N]o one even knows what to balance, since practically any transaction undertaken by
an exempt charity will result in benefit to some private party outside the charitable class.”);
Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 143 (“In reality it is difficult to apply the private benefit
analysis.”).
72. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1093.
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73

lacks an articulable general theory. To make matters worse, the IRS
has been inconsistent in its application of the doctrine—applying it in
74
some cases and not in others. Additionally, no case law exists that
would help clarify the doctrine; the case that would have provided the
75
most promising chance at fully delineating the doctrine was settled.
Recognizing that the private benefit doctrine is unclear, this Part
briefly outlines the generally agreed-upon tenets of the private
benefit doctrine and discusses three existing theories on how to apply
it. These theories are then used in Part III to analyze a land trust’s
risk of violating the private benefit doctrine if it approves a neutralimpact amendment.
A. The Private Benefit Doctrine: Basic Tenets
Although the motivations and contours of the private benefit
doctrine remain vague, two aspects of the doctrine are clear. First, the
overarching goal of the doctrine is to ensure that tax-exempt
organizations operate for a charitable purpose; and second, taxexempt organizations cannot, directly or indirectly, confer a
substantial private benefit on noncharitable individuals or
76
organizations.

73. See id. at 1067–80 (detailing the history, origins, and inconsistent application of the
private benefit doctrine); see also Colombo, supra note 7, at 47 (“Even the Treasury
Regulations apply the term to at least two distinct analytical paradigms, one involving the size of
the charitable class and two involving economic arrangements with third parties. A review of
private rulings and cases indicates that neither the courts nor the IRS really know what the
phrase ‘private benefit’ means.”).
74. Compare Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, 976 (ruling on the tax-exempt status of
ancillary partnerships between for-profit and tax-exempt entities without undertaking an
analysis of the private benefit doctrine), and Colombo, supra note 7, at 12–13 (finding that the
“private benefit analysis disappeared” in Revenue Ruling 2004-51, 2004-1 C.B. 974, “one of the
most anticipated exemption rulings of the new millennium,” even though it had been used in a
similar ruling on joint ventures), with Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 719 (discussing the
private benefit doctrine in the context of joint ventures between for-profit and tax-exempt
entities).
75. See United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1999) (remanding
the case to consider whether application of the private benefit doctrine was appropriate).
76. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Overview of Inurement/Private Benefit Issues
in IRC 501(c)(3), in IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION
TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 1990, at 3 (1990), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopicc90.pdf (explaining that there is no single means to assess
whether a tax-exempt organization has conferred an impermissible benefit to a private entity);
Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 137 (“This article discusses the concept of ‘private benefit’ under
IRC 501(c)(3) and then describes how it applies to specific fact patterns that raise private
benefit issues in two areas: housing and charter schools.”).
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1. Operating for a Charitable Purpose. The private benefit
doctrine is designed to ensure that a tax-exempt organization actually
operates as a charitable organization. To gain or maintain its taxexempt status, an organization must be “organized and operated
exclusively” for one of the charitable purposes listed in § 501(c)(3),
which includes religious, charitable, scientific, or educational
77
purposes.
As § 501(c)(3) entities, tax-exempt organizations are exempt
from federal income tax and often receive exemptions from state
78
property taxes, and their donors can take charitable deductions.
These various tax benefits constitute a government subsidy for tax79
exempt organizations. The benefits also create an incentive for
abuse. For instance, a tax-exempt organization could be used as a tax
80
81
shelter or as a moneymaking strategy, or it could be used to avoid
82
taxation of an otherwise commercial business. In any of these
instances, the federal government wants to ensure that the implicit
subsidy of these organizations goes only toward charitable purposes
83
and the public good. The private benefit doctrine is a key check on
tax-exempt organizations because it is one way the IRS ensures that a
84
85
nonprofit is in fact charitable and not a “for-profit[] in disguise.”
2. Derivation and General Rules. Although the private benefit
doctrine is not written into § 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C., the IRS derives it
from Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii), which interprets

77. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
78. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ, TAXATION OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 52, 75 (3d ed. 2010).
79. Id. at 75–76.
80. Id. at 7.
81. See, e.g., id. (“[T]he Foundation for New Era Philanthropy, a Pennsylvania charity that
promised to double the money of donors and charities who entrusted New Era with millions of
dollars, was a classic Ponzi scheme.”).
82. See, e.g., id. at 8 (“The Atlantic Monthly chronicled the increasing commercialism of
American higher education, such as lucrative research alliances and licensing deals with forprofit companies, sales of naming rights for professorships, buildings and athletic facilities, and
forays into distance learning and other ‘dot com’ businesses.”).
83. See, e.g., id. at 9–10 (discussing increased scrutiny of tax-exempt organizations by
Congress and the IRS to ensure that tax-exempt status is not abused).
84. See id. at 221 (“[The private benefit doctrine] is just another way of saying that an
organization must be operated exclusively for exempt purposes . . . .”).
85. Burton A. Weisbrod, The Nonprofit Mission and Its Financing: Growing Links Between
Nonprofits and the Rest of the Economy, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT: THE COMMERCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR 1, 11 (Burton A. Weisbrod ed., 1998).
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§ 501(c)(3) to provide that “[a]n organization is not organized or
operated exclusively for [exempt purposes] unless it serves a public
86
rather than a private interest.” In American Campaign Academy v.
87
Commissioner, the Tax Court further defined a private benefit as the
conveyance by a tax-exempt organization of “nonincidental benefits
88
conferred on disinterested persons.” Secondary private benefits,
benefits that are conferred on individuals or entities whom the
organization does not directly serve, are also sufficient for the IRS to
find a tax-exempt organization to be in violation of the private benefit
89
doctrine.
Because tax-exempt organizations will unavoidably create some
private benefit to others through their charitable operations, creating
90
an incidental private benefit is permissible. For example, a soup
kitchen that buys food for the homeless families that it serves conveys
a private benefit to a supermarket. Likewise, volunteers at taxexempt organizations receive noneconomic private benefits such as
the satisfaction of serving their community. In each of these instances,
however, the organization primarily serves a public interest, and the
private benefit is incidental.
Conferring a substantial private benefit, on the other hand, is
91
impermissible. According to the IRS, whether a benefit is substantial
is measured on a transaction-by-transaction basis. If an individual
receives a benefit from the tax-exempt organization that is greater
than the charitable or public benefit created by that transaction, the
92
organization can lose its tax-exempt status. The IRS uses both a
qualitative and a quantitative analysis to determine whether or not a
86. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
87. Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
88. Id. at 1069.
89. See, e.g., id. at 1073–75 (denying tax-exempt status to an educational organization
because it created a substantial “secondary” private benefit to the Republican Party, as most of
its graduates worked for the party upon graduation).
90. See Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unanswered Questions from Redlands
Surgical Services, 29 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 433, 443 (2000) (“[I]n many instances, an entity
must benefit somebody in particular to achieve its charitable purpose.”).
91. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)
(finding that the creation of a private benefit, “if substantial in nature, will destroy the
exemption regardless of the number or importance” of an organization’s other charitable
purposes or activities).
92. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 9 (Nov. 21, 1991) (“It bears emphasis that, even
though exemption of the entire organization may be at stake, the private benefit conferred by
an activity or arrangement is balanced only against the public benefit conferred by that activity
or arrangement, not the overall good accomplished by the organization.”).

GENTRY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

3/17/2013 3:51 PM

CONSERVATION-EASEMENT AMENDMENTS

1405

93

private benefit is incidental or substantial. Under the qualitative
analysis, a private benefit is incidental when it is an unavoidable
94
result or a “mere byproduct of the public benefit.” For example, the
IRS found that an increase in property values and personal
enjoyment generated by an organization formed to preserve and
beautify a lake for recreation constituted an insubstantial private
benefit because the increase was an unavoidable result of the lake
95
beautification. Thus, the private benefit was merely incidental to the
public benefit of the lake beautification.
The quantitative private benefit analysis weighs the private
benefit against the public benefit. Under this analysis, the private
benefit must be quantitatively less than the public benefit created by
96
the activity. The IRS uses two different factors to measure the
quantitative private benefit: the number of individuals or
organizations benefited and the net financial benefit received by
97
those organizations.
If a small number of individuals or
organizations receive a benefit, the IRS is likely to find that a private
98
benefit is substantial. If the financial benefit to an individual or
organization is greater than the financial benefit to the public, the
99
IRS will also likely find that the private benefit is substantial.
B. Defining and Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine: Three
Theories and Tests
Although some general rules and principles behind the private
benefit doctrine do exist, the practical application of the doctrine is
100
difficult because no unifying or coherent test exists. Instead, three
different tests attempt to interpret and apply the private benefit
doctrine. Under one test, the doctrine is violated when a tax-exempt
101
organization’s activities demonstrate a lack of a charitable class.
Under another test, the doctrine simply applies as one part of the
102
IRS’s operational test. Under the third test, the doctrine is violated
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789, at 3 (Dec. 18, 1978).
Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 139.
Rev. Rul. 70-186, 1970-1 C.B. 129.
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 9.
Megosh et al., supra note 3, at 139–40.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 71.
Colombo, supra note 7, at 20.
See infra notes 110–111 and accompanying text.
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when a tax-exempt organization’s activities demonstrate a failure to
103
conserve charitable assets. Each test is based on its own distinct
theory about the purpose of the private benefit doctrine.
1. The Private Benefit Doctrine as an Assessment of the Lack of a
Charitable Class. Under this theory, the private benefit doctrine
restates the common-law rule that “a charity must serve a broad
104
charitable class.” The test focuses on the size of the charitable class
to determine whether or not a transaction conveys a private benefit.
If the charitable class for a given benefit is too small or does not exist,
the IRS will find that the tax-exempt organization conferred a
105
substantial private benefit. The example commonly cited to support
this theory is a revenue ruling in which the IRS denied tax-exempt
106
status to an organization created to improve one city block, even
though the IRS had previously granted tax-exempt status to an
107
organization created to beautify an entire city. Under this theory,
the organization created to improve one city block was denied tax108
exempt status because the organization had too few beneficiaries.
103. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1088–89. Professor Colombo briefly notes a fourth theory,
the “failure of duty of care.” See Colombo, supra note 7, at 22–25 (discussing private benefit as
the federal incorporation of a duty of care); see also United Cancer Council v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d
1173, 1180 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he board of a charity has a duty of care, just like the board of an
ordinary business corporation, and a violation of that duty which involved the dissipation of the
charity’s assets might . . . support a finding that the charity was conferring a private benefit, even
if the contracting party did not control, or exercise undue influence over, the charity.” (citations
omitted)). This theory, however, is only briefly mentioned in one case and does not seem to
have been used or further explained in any IRS writings. This Note thus does not discuss it
further.
104. Colombo, supra note 7, at 4.
105. See, e.g., id. (“[F]or example, a trust to maintain a public graveyard was considered
charitable, but not one to maintain a[n] individual’s private tomb.”).
106. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, 210; see also Colombo, supra note 7, at 4 (using the
ruling as an example of the theory that a “charity must serve a broad charitable class”).
107. Rev. Rul. 68-14, 1968-1 C.B. 243.
108. Rev. Rul. 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. at 210. One problem with using this example to support
this theory is that the IRS, in Revenue Ruling 75-286, 1975-2 C.B. 210, examined not only the
size of a tax-exempt organization’s charitable class, but also the amount of financial private
benefit given to the landowners, id. In the revenue ruling, the IRS specifically noted that the
beautification of one city block would give a substantial private benefit to adjacent landowners
who would see an increase in their property values. Id. The IRS examined not merely the size of
the charitable class, but also how the size of the financial private benefit compared to the overall
public benefit. It is unclear whether the IRS would have come to the same result had it solely
discussed the size of the nonprofit’s charitable class.
One way to address this ambiguity would be to expand the charitable-class theory by
combining it with the IRS’s existing quantitative analysis. See supra notes 97–99 and
accompanying text. Under this expanded theory, “substantial” private benefit can be measured
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2. The Private Benefit Doctrine as a Part of the Operational Test.
Under this theory, the private benefit doctrine is part of the
operational test that the IRS uses to determine whether or not an
109
organization is operated for a charitable purpose. The operational
test is composed of three different parts: the substantial-nonexemptpurpose test, the private inurement test, and the private benefit
110
doctrine. These parts overlap to some degree, but each serves its
own distinct purpose, allowing the IRS to revoke or deny an
organization’s charitable status based on the presence of many
111
different factors.
As part of the operational test, the private benefit doctrine
weighs the charitable purpose of the organization against the benefit
112
received by private, noncharitable interests. For example, a hospital
that provides services to a large charitable class and that fulfills its
charitable purpose may be found to have conveyed a substantial
private benefit if the hospital’s structure creates a private benefit for
the controlling physicians such that they have a “closed, preferential
113
system in which to practice medicine.” In this instance a charitable
purpose exists, but the private benefit given to the physicians is too

both by the size of the charitable class and by comparing the amount of financially quantifiable
private benefit to the financial benefit to the public. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying
text. Under the expanded version of the theory, the block’s beautification organization in
Revenue Ruling 75-286 created a substantial private benefit because it benefitted a small
charitable class and increased the landowners’ property values, outweighing the increase in the
value to the public. The organization dedicated to beautifying an entire city, however, did not
create a substantial private benefit because its charitable class was the entire public, and the
private benefits did not outweigh the public benefits because they were unquantifiable and an
unavoidable result of the public benefit.
109. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra
note 76, at 12 (“[T]he operational test standard prohibiting a substantial non-exempt purpose is
broad enough to include inurement, private benefit, and operations which further nonprofit
goals outside the scope of IRC 501(c)(3).”).
110. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 22 (Mar. 11, 2011) (“The operational test is not
satisfied where any part of the organization’s earnings inure to the benefit of private
shareholders or individuals, and where the organization serves a private benefit rather than
public interests.”).
111. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2004-31023, at 20 (July 30, 2004) (“The private benefit
theory and the substantial nonexempt purpose theory overlap substantially. They both are
rooted in the operational test. The differences are not so much ones of legal principle as they
are ones of the types of facts that tend to lead to the conclusion that the operational test has not
been met.”).
112. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862, at 9 (Nov. 21, 1991) (“Determining whether a benefit
flowing to private individuals evidences a substantial noncharitable purpose frequently requires
balancing [the private benefit against the public benefit].”).
113. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1082.
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great in comparison. The nonprofit hospital with such a structure
would not operate charitably but rather for the benefit of the
physicians.
One criticism of this theory is that it makes the private benefit
doctrine no different than the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test
because the existence of a substantial private benefit can result in the
revocation or denial of an organization’s charitable status, even if the
organization’s overall charitable purposes outweigh the private
114
benefit created by the transaction. Thus, if the private benefit
doctrine is to be useful as a stand-alone doctrine, it must be more
115
than shorthand for the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test.
But the private benefit doctrine is not just a substitute for
another test. Instead, it is an expansion of the methods with which the
IRS can either revoke or deny an organization’s tax-exempt status.
Each part of the operational test addresses a different area of abuse.
The first part, the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test, specifically
looks at the purpose of the charity: does it qualify under
116
§ 501(c)(3)? If there are multiple purposes, are a substantial number
117
of those purposes tax-exempt? If not, the organization’s tax-exempt
status will be revoked or denied. The second part of the operational
test—examining private inurement and excess-benefit transactions—
is designed to ensure that insiders of a tax-exempt organization do
118
not “unjustly enrich” themselves at a cost to the organization. The
private inurement doctrine prohibits the inurement of net earnings to
119
insiders. If the IRS finds private inurement, it will sanction the
120
nonprofit by revoking or denying its tax-exempt status. The
prohibition of excess-benefit transactions supplements the private
inurement test by expanding the definition of insiders to include
121
“disqualified individuals” and by allowing the IRS to use excise
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 24–26 (Mar. 11, 2011).
117. Id.
118. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 76, at 1–3.
119. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
120. See Michael Folz Wexler & Alvin J. Geske, The Private Benefit Rule and Interaction of
Excess Benefit Transaction Taxes with Revocation, 104 J. TAX’N 304, 304 (2006) (“These excise
tax sanctions were thought to be a more effective way to enforce the no-inurement requirement
than revocation of exemption in most instances where the transgression was relatively minor in
comparison with the charitable activities of the organization.”).
121. The excess-benefit-transaction regulations prohibit the provision of an excess economic
benefit to “disqualified person[s],” which include anyone who can “exercise substantial

GENTRY IN FR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

3/17/2013 3:51 PM

CONSERVATION-EASEMENT AMENDMENTS

1409

taxes as intermediate sanctions if the IRS finds an excess-benefit
122
transaction to have occurred.
The substantial purpose and private inurement tests alone,
however, only address abuses of an organization’s tax-exempt status
by insiders or disqualified individuals. There are still opportunities for
abuse in ways that benefit those unrelated to a nonprofit. The private
benefit doctrine gives the IRS the ability to catch those abuses that do
not violate either the substantial-nonexempt-purpose or the private
inurement tests. Thus the operational test in its entirety helps the IRS
123
address multiple types of abusive organizations. Each part of the
test addresses a different type of abuse—noncharitable purposes,
insider transactions, and financial and nonfinancial benefits to
disinterested individuals or organizations—that outweighs the
benefits conferred on the public or the relevant charitable class.
3. The Private Benefit Doctrine as an Assessment of a Failure To
Conserve Charitable Assets. The third theory, developed by Professor
John Colombo, views the private benefit doctrine as a tool for
policing joint ventures between tax-exempt and for-profit
organizations by splitting an organization’s activities into routine and
124
core services. Under this theory, the private benefit doctrine does
125
not apply to a tax-exempt organization’s routine services but may
apply to its core services depending on the circumstances of the
126
transaction. This theory begins with a presumption that creating a
127
private benefit is incidental for routine services. Routine services
are those services that are unrelated to the charitable mission of the

influence over the affairs of the organization” as well as their family members, and any
corporation in which the individual or his or her family has more than a 35 percent stake. I.R.C.
§ 4958(f)(1) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
122. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(a) (as amended in 2002). For the first violation, the tax is
equivalent to 25 percent of the excess benefit against the individual who received the benefit,
and the person who authorized the transaction is taxed 10 percent on the benefit. Id. § 53.49581(c)(1). If the organization does not fix the private inurement issue, the tax for the recipient
increases to 200 percent of the total benefit received. Id. § 53.4958-1(c)(2).
123. On first glance, it can be difficult to rationalize why a tax-exempt organization would
confer benefits to an outsider who is not part of the charitable class. Yet, there are instances in
which such organizations give inappropriate benefits to noninsiders. See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 2011-10020, at 26–27 (Mar. 11, 2011) (finding that a land trust gave excessive financial
benefits to landowners and donors who were not insiders).
124. Colombo, supra note 71, at 1087.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 1087–88.
127. Colombo, supra note 7, at 28.
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organization but that are necessary for the organization to function.
For example, hiring for-profit janitorial services or contracting with
utilities to provide heat and electricity are routine services that create
129
an unavoidable private benefit. The theory presumes that the type
of private benefit created by routine services is incidental because the
benefit conferred allows the nonprofit to focus the majority of its
130
funds on its mission. For example, a soup kitchen would not invest
in building its own power source when it could pay a utility company
for electricity and spend more of its resources on feeding the
131
hungry. Because arms-length contracts for routine services are
economically efficient and are unlikely to create large opportunities
for abuse, the theory presumes that these contracts create only
132
incidental private benefit.
This presumption of incidental private benefit, however, does
not apply when the transaction relates to the core services of the tax133
exempt organization. Core services are “services that form the core
134
primary charitable purpose” of the organization. Under this theory,
the private benefit doctrine should apply when a tax-exempt
organization “outsources the delivery of its core services” or when it
enters into an economic transaction that gives a for-profit firm a
135
competitive advantage.
In each instance the tax-exempt
organization runs the risk of failing to conserve charitable assets
because they are used in for-profit transactions when those assets
136
could instead be used to benefit a charitable class. A tax-exempt
organization can avoid a finding of failing to conserve charitable
assets if it shows a reasonable justification for why the transaction is
in the best interests of the charitable class, namely that the
arrangement is a “more efficient or ‘better’ way to deliver services to
137
the charitable class.”
***

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 28, 30.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 30.
Colombo, supra note 71, at 1087.
Id. at 1089.
Colombo, supra note 7, at 30.
Colombo, supra note 71, at 1089.
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In short, the private benefit doctrine is indeed a mess. When
amending farmland conservation easements, land trusts are left
wondering how the private benefit doctrine might be applied. A land
trust has no way to know if it will be judged based on the size of the
charitable class, how it will be viewed under the operational test, or if
it might be viewed as a joint venture that is outsourcing its core
services or giving for-profit organizations a competitive advantage.
III. THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE AND NEUTRAL-IMPACT
AMENDMENTS

Neutral-impact amendments—amendments that help balance a
working-land easement’s goal of keeping farmland in production
without sacrificing conservation value—likely violate the private
benefit doctrine under all three theories that were discussed in the
previous Part. This is an unfortunate outcome. By approving a
neutral-impact amendment, a land trust does not reduce the
conservation value of the land. Neither does a land trust, in approving
such an amendment, abuse the organization’s tax-exempt status
because the amendment does not undermine the land trust’s
charitable purpose and because the land trust’s earnings do not inure
to the benefit of insiders. Instead the amendment fulfills the other
goal of the underlying conservation easement by keeping farmland in
production and addressing the needs of the farmer. A neutral-impact
amendment allows the farmer to modify farming operations without
negatively impacting the conservation value of the land—a good way
for the land trust to meet one of its goals without sacrificing the other.
The analysis in the two examples below, however, suggests that a
neutral-impact amendment will likely violate the private benefit
doctrine. But this outcome seems counterintuitive, particularly
because the amendment attempts to balance the competing purposes
inherent in farmland and working-land conservation easements by
fulfilling the needs of the farmer without injuring the conservation
value of the land itself.
A. Example One: Installing Cell Antennas in Silos
The first example of a neutral-impact amendment that is likely to
violate the private benefit doctrine is an amendment allowing a local
138. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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utility to install cellular antennas on conserved farms. In this example,
a local utility asked several farmers if it could install cellular antennas
139
on or inside the farmers’ silos. The installed antennas would have
zero conservation impact. They would be “virtually invisible,”
keeping open space and scenic views intact, and they would not
require additional land to be released from existing development
140
restrictions. Additionally, the antennas would not impede the
farmers’ use of the silos, and their installation would allow the utility
to use existing structures rather than build new cellular towers on
141
previously undeveloped land. In many ways this would seem like a
straightforward decision—the farmers would gain additional income
from leasing the silo, other land would remain protected from the
new development for cellular towers, scenic views would be
preserved, and the antennas would improve overall cellular coverage
142
for the general public.
Several of the farmers in this example, however, had conserved
their land through conservation easements. As written, these
easements prohibit commercial uses on the farm, except those
143
specifically named in the easement. For example, an easement limits
the farm to “agriculture, forestry, home occupations, and ‘accessory
144
uses,’ such as making cheese from milk produced on the farm.” To
install the antennas, the farmers and the land trust would need to
145
amend the easement. Although the benefits of the proposed
amendment would be many, a review of the three theories of the
private benefit doctrine seems to indicate that an amendment like this
would violate the private benefit doctrine.
1. Examining the Size of the Charitable Class. Under the theory
that the IRS must assess the size of a nonprofit’s charitable class, the
approval of this request to install an antenna seems immediately to
violate the private benefit doctrine. The amendment would directly
benefit only one farmer and would indirectly benefit the utility
company. The general public may recognize some benefit through the
preservation of the scenic view, but the primary purpose of the
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

This hypothetical is derived from Bradley, supra note 1, at 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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amendment is not to protect the scenic view. Rather, the amendment
is meant to allow the farmer, who is not a member of the land trust’s
charitable class, to install an antenna on his farm.
2. Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine as Part of the
Operational Test.
The transaction also likely fails under the
operational test because it creates a substantial private benefit that
probably outweighs the public benefit created by the amendment. In
this transaction, a quantifiable primary private benefit would be
conferred on the landowner because the silo would generate rental
income. The utility company would receive a quantifiable secondary
private benefit in the form of decreased antenna-construction costs
and an extended network. Both of these private benefits are quite
substantial, particularly when weighed against the fact that the
amendment did not further the conservation purposes of the
easement. Yet, the amendment would also create some positive
public benefit—it would protect other lands from being developed
and would preserve scenic views from being broken up by larger
cellular towers. It is unclear, however, if this public benefit would
outweigh the substantial private benefit conferred on both the farmer
and the utility.
Viewing the private benefit doctrine in relation to the other parts
of the operational test, the land trust is still operating primarily for a
charitable purpose, and its net earnings do not inure to any insiders.
Even so, because this single transaction created a substantial private
benefit, the IRS has the authority to revoke the tax-exempt status of
146
the land trust if it were to approve this amendment. But should this
private benefit jeopardize the land trust’s tax-exempt status when the
amendment would not negatively impact the conservation value of
the easement and would not otherwise violate the operational test?
3. Testing a Failure To Conserve Charitable Assets. It is difficult
to determine how this amendment fits into the third test, which
inquires into a tax-exempt organization’s failure to conserve
charitable assets. The first question under this test is whether
amending a conservation easement would be considered a core
147
service related directly to the entity’s charitable purpose. In this
case, the core service of the land trust is to protect land. One could

146. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
147. Colombo, supra note 7, at 30.
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argue that the proposed amendment is directly related to the core
services of the land trust because it would change the conservation
easement, which is the main method that a land trust uses to preserve
148
land. Conversely, perhaps the amendment is not related to the core
services of the land trust because it would not have any effect on the
purposes or conservation value of the easement. Under this
understanding of core services, an amendment would only be related
to the core services of the land trust if the amendment had a negative
or a positive conservation impact.
If an analysis determined that approving neutral-impact
amendments is a routine service of a land trust, the examination
149
under the private benefit doctrine would stop there. If approving
the amendments is determined to be a land trust’s core service, the
amendment would violate the private benefit doctrine if the
transaction allowed the land trust to do one of two things: either
outsource its core services or enter into an economic transaction that
150
creates a competitive advantage for a for-profit entity.
The
transaction in this hypothetical would not fit into the first category
because the land trust would not be outsourcing its work. The land
trust would not be contracting with another for-profit entity to
provide land preservation services in its place. The transaction may fit
into the second category, but it is unclear if an economic transaction
would be present. The land trust merely would be giving the farmer
permission to enter into a transaction that created an economic
benefit for both the farmer and the utility. Is giving permission to
someone else to enter into an economic transaction the same as
151
entering into an economic transaction? If this amendment were
considered an economic transaction, it would create a competitive
advantage for two for-profit parties. It would offer the farmer
supplemental income and would provide the utility a better

148. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
149. See Colombo, supra note 7, at 30 (positing that the IRS should not apply the private
benefit doctrine to “routine transactions for ‘incidental’ services”).
150. Id.
151. A similar question to the one posed in this discussion is whether a land trust that gives
permission to a farmer to grant a benefit to another entity should be treated the same as a land
trust that confers a private benefit on the farmer. Although this Note does not delve into this
question, it may be worth future scholarly exploration.
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distribution network, both of which would violate the private benefit
152
doctrine.
B. Example Two: Land Swap To Increase Farm Viability
Another common example of a neutral-impact amendment that
likely violates the private benefit doctrine is a land swap used to
increase farm viability. In this example, a dairy farm was conserved
thirty years ago. The original conservation easement conserved 125
153
acres of land and set aside fifteen acres for the farmstead complex.
Initially the fifteen acres were sufficient for the farmer to operate and
run a successful farm. As technology and the dairy market changed,
however, the farmstead complex eventually became too small to
support the farm structures necessary to sustain the farming
operation. If the farmer could not expand his operations, the farm
would likely go out of business.
The farmer then proposed a land swap, asking the land trust to
release the conservation easement’s restrictions on ten acres of land
adjoining the existing farmstead complex in return for conserving an
154
additional ten acres of land with comparable conservation value.
This land swap would have a neutral conservation impact: while ten
acres would be opened to development, an additional ten acres would
be preserved. Again, similar to the antenna example, this seems to be
a mutually beneficial transaction—the farm would remain viable, it
could adapt to changing circumstances, and there would be no net
loss to the conservation value of the land trust’s easement.
1. Examining the Size of the Charitable Class. The land trust’s
approval of the land swap would likely violate the private benefit
doctrine under the theory that examines the size of the tax-exempt
organization’s charitable class. The amendment would benefit only
one farmer who is not a member of the charitable class. Nor would
the amendment seem to create a benefit for the public because the
net sum of land preserved, and thus the total conservation value
protected, would remain the same.

152. The land trust would be at risk of violating the private benefit doctrine with respect to
both the farmer and the utility, as the utility would receive a secondary private benefit. See
supra notes 83–89 and accompanying text.
153. For the definition of farmstead complex, see supra text accompanying note 53.
154. The author developed this example through conversations with Dennis Shaffer,
Director of Stewardship, and Rick Peterson, Project Counsel, at the Vermont Land Trust.
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2. Applying the Private Benefit Doctrine as Part of the
Operational Test. The land-swap amendment would also likely
violate the private benefit doctrine under the operational test. Under
this test, the amendment would not further the conservation purposes
of the easement and would confer a seemingly substantial private
benefit on a disinterested individual: the increase in the size of the
farmstead complex would allow the farmer to increase the production
and viability of the farm. This private benefit would outweigh the
seemingly nonexistent public benefit. If, however, public benefits are
judged on a broader scale—that is, if protecting working lands and
balancing land uses create a public benefit—perhaps this transaction
155
would not violate the private benefit doctrine. Once again, this
predicament highlights the following question: should the creation of
a private benefit be enough to revoke a land trust’s tax-exempt status
when it would not negatively impact the conservation value of the
easement and would not violate any other part of the operational
test?
3. Testing a Failure To Conserve Charitable Assets. The landswap example would also likely violate the theory of the public
benefit doctrine based on a failure to conserve charitable assets. The
156
core-service debate remains the same as in the previous example. If
approving the amendment is determined to be a core service, the land
trust would not seem to have outsourced its core services, but rather
would seem to have entered into an economic transaction. The land
trust would participate in an exchange of land, removing restrictions
on ten acres of land in return for adding new restrictions on a
different ten acres. The economic transaction would likely create a
competitive advantage for the farmer, which violates the private
157
benefit doctrine under Professor Colombo’s theory. Increasing the
size of the farmstead complex would allow the farmer to adapt to and
compete in the changing economy, but this would give the farmer a
competitive advantage and thus violating the private benefit doctrine.
***

155. See infra Part IV.D.
156. See supra Part III.A.3.
157. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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Both examples in this Part illustrate the counterintuitive results
created by the application of the private benefit doctrine to neutralimpact amendments. In each example, the land trust approves an
amendment that furthers one of the easement’s goals: supporting
agricultural use. Plus, the amendment does not negatively impact the
conservation value of the land. A land trust should not run the risk of
violating the private benefit doctrine with such an amendment. As
such, this Note argues that the IRS should consider the private
benefit doctrine to be a doctrine that protects against abuse and
should not apply it to neutral-impact amendments.
IV. MOVING THE PRIVATE BENEFIT DOCTRINE FORWARD
The application of the private benefit doctrine to neutral-impact
amendments creates undesirable results. It makes little sense to put a
land trust at risk of losing its tax-exempt status when an amendment
gives farmers the flexibility under the easement to keep the land in
production without decreasing the underlying conservation value of
the land. Through such an amendment, the land trust can further one
purpose of the easement without sacrificing the other. Thus, the IRS
should not apply the private benefit doctrine to neutral-impact
amendments. The messiness of the private benefit doctrine itself
would justify efforts by the IRS to clarify the doctrine, particularly in
areas in which its application is unclear or would create undesirable
results. The existing theories behind the doctrine are targeted to
address very different circumstances than those created by the
approval of a neutral-impact amendment. Two of the three theories
behind the private benefit doctrine—the theory based on the lack of a
charitable class and the theory that places the private benefit doctrine
as part of the operational test—seem to be designed to prevent clear
abuses of the nonprofit status. These theories test for organizations
that do not violate the substantial-nonexempt-purpose test or the
private inurement doctrine yet still do not seem entirely charitable or
158
else are for-profit organizations in disguise. The third theory, the
158. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 76-206, 1976-1 C.B. 154 (finding that an organization that sought to
preserve and maintain classical music programming did have a valid charitable purpose and did
not violate the private inurement doctrine, but did violate the private benefit doctrine because
“[i]t was formed in response to an announcement by a local for-profit radio station that the
station intended to cease broadcasting classical music because of financial difficulty” and
because “[t]he organization accomplishe[d] its purpose by engaging in a variety of activities
designed to stimulate public interest in the classical music programs of the for-profit station, and
thereby enable the station to continue broadcasting such music”).
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failure to preserve charitable assets, was developed to address the
159
private benefit doctrine in relation to joint ventures. Land trusts, if
following all other rules, do not fit under any of these theories when
approving a neutral-impact amendment—they are neither a for-profit
in disguise nor a joint venture.
The IRS has also been inconsistent in its application of the
private benefit doctrine. Not only do the theories behind the doctrine
vary, but the IRS has also chosen not to apply the doctrine in
160
instances in which common sense would expect it to be applied.
With a doctrine as open for interpretation as this one, the IRS has the
ability to choose not to apply the private benefit doctrine to neutralimpact amendments, and it should decline to do so. But this decision
should not be ad hoc. Instead, the IRS should use formal guidance
such as a revenue ruling to acknowledge that neutral-impact
amendments do not violate the private benefit doctrine. This would
161
create a clear standard for land trusts and reduce confusion.
The IRS should not apply the private benefit doctrine to neutralimpact amendments for several reasons. First, the private benefit
doctrine should be used only to curb abuses. Second, these
amendments allow land trusts and the IRS to recognize and balance
the inherent tension in preserving working lands as open space. Third,
some neutral-impact amendments merely update an easement to
reflect current easement-drafting standards. Fourth, the preservation
of working lands creates a public benefit that outweighs the
conveyance of a private benefit. And finally, allowing such
amendments may encourage the use of working-land conservation
easements in general.
A. Private Benefit as an Anti-Abuse Doctrine
The private benefit doctrine should only be used to curb abuses.
In the case of conservation easements, the private benefit doctrine

159. See Colombo, supra note 71, at 1092 (discussing the private benefit doctrine in relation
to joint ventures).
160. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
161. Instead of using a revenue ruling, the IRS could create intermediate sanctions for a taxexempt organization that violates the private benefit doctrine similar to the sanctions the IRS
gives for a violation of the excess-benefit-transaction test. See supra notes 121–122 and
accompanying text. Depending on which factors the IRS decided to use, neutral impact
amendments might not violate the private benefit doctrine. The implications of creating a
formal set of factors for discerning violations of the private benefit doctrine would be fertile
ground for further scholarly investigation.
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should apply only to amendments that negatively impact the
conservation value of an easement. For example, a recent revocation
of a land trust’s tax-exempt status, based in part on the approval of
several negative conservation impact amendments, illustrates a clear
162
violation and the proper application of the private benefit doctrine.
In this example, a land trust approved several amendments that
163
allowed the landowners to subdivide and build on their property.
These amendments dramatically increased the value of the land to the
landowners and significantly reduced the amount of land protected
164
from development.
Unlike approving an amendment that negatively impacts an
easement’s conservation value, approving a neutral-impact
amendment, unless accompanied by other violations, is not an abuse
of an organization’s tax-exempt status. A land trust that follows the
LTA amendment policies, works toward a charitable end, and does
not inure its net earnings to insiders should not be at risk of losing its
tax-exempt status simply because it approves a neutral-impact
amendment. It is one thing when a land trust allows the landowner to
subdivide and develop conserved land. It is another when the
amendment helps further one of the easement’s twin goals—to keep
the land in productive agricultural use—without negatively impacting
the land’s conservation value.

162. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2011-10020, at 27–29 (Mar. 11, 2011). This revenue ruling also
provides an excellent example of a conservation land trust that clearly abused its nonprofit
status. In addition to finding substantial private benefit in regard to the amendments, the IRS
found that: (1) “[m]ore than an insubstantial part of [the land trust’s] activities” were in
“furtherance of a non-exempt purpose,” id. at 1; (2) private inurement existed; and (3) the land
trust conferred a private benefit to its donors, id. at 27–29. The IRS based this finding on the
following facts: First, the land trust did not have any of the policies, procedures, or resources in
place to ensure that the land was used for conservation purposes alone. Id. at 25. Without the
commitment to protect the conservation easements, land owners were free to gain a deduction
on their donation while still using the land however they chose. Second, the net earnings of the
organization inured to the benefit of the president of the organization, including unreported
fringe benefits and consultant fees. Id. at 22. Third, the IRS found that there was significant
private benefit given to each donor. Id. at 27. The donors improperly received a charitable
contribution deduction because the organization was not a “qualified organization.” Id. In
addition to failing the entire operational test, the organization failed to follow filing
requirements and donated to a mayoral race, which violated § 501(c)(3) prohibitions on
participating in a political campaign. Id. at 28.
163. Id. at 27.
164. Id.
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B. Balancing the Tensions Inherent in Preserving Working Lands
Over the years, the IRS has allowed tax-exempt land trusts to
165
preserve farmland and working lands, but it has not focused on the
inherent tensions in allowing such preservation. By not applying the
private benefit doctrine to neutral-impact amendments, the IRS can
acknowledge this tension and give land trusts due flexibility to
balance the needs of land preservation with the needs of a working,
productive farm—as directed by the conservation easement itself.
In essence, the IRS, by approving the tax-exempt status of a land
trust and by permitting a charitable deduction for donations of
working-land easements to land trusts, has approved the conferral of
some private benefit: the donor retains current and future rights to
benefit from the working land. For example, an easement may allow
166
the landowner to build an additional building on the preserved land.
These sorts of benefits are negotiated into an easement and are
themselves in service of the overall charitable pursuit of conserving
167
land. Without providing some current and future benefit to the
landowner, the landowner has little incentive to donate a
conservation easement. Thus, some private benefit is already baked
into a working-land easement; they are just generally seen as
insubstantial in light of the larger charitable purpose of preserving
land.
Further, by allowing farmland easements that explicitly state two
purposes, the IRS has implicitly sanctioned the benefit that
preservation of agricultural use creates for farmers. This agricultural
use, however, is an unavoidable benefit created to preserve the land
for charitable purposes. A neutral-impact amendment merely allows
the land trust to better meet the secondary goal of productive
agricultural use—a private benefit already integrated within the
easement and certified by the IRS’s approval of the easement.
If a land trust is able to approve a neutral-impact amendment
without risk of violating the private benefit doctrine, the land trust
can help a farm adjust to new situations or technologies that may not
have been contemplated when the easement was created. Such

165. See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
167. See Hutton, supra note 35, at 1.17 (“[T]he activities of the Conservancy are exclusively
aimed at the production of public benefit, and acquisitions from landowners through donations
or via purchases not in excess of fair market value can hardly be said to confer any unwarranted
benefit to participating landowners.”).
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support for the farmer, however, would not remove or reduce the
conservation value of the land. Instead, the amendment addresses the
needs of the farmer without impacting the charitable purpose of
preservation, thereby meeting both goals of a farmland easement.
C. Updating the Easement
A neutral-impact amendment that is used to bring an easement
up to current best practices should not create a risk of violating the
private benefit doctrine. Some neutral-impact amendments, such as
168
the amendment described in the cellular-antenna example, merely
update the farmer’s easement to include rights developed or
recognized after the easement is donated or sold to the land trust. For
instance, many of today’s easements include rural-enterprises or newtechnologies clauses. These clauses allow a farmer to use the land for
nonagricultural activities if the land used is within the farmstead
169
complex and the activity has a neutral conservation impact. A
farmer with a newer conservation easement that included these
clauses who wanted to add antennas to his farm’s silos would be able
to do so without an amendment, and the land trust would not risk
170
violating the private benefit doctrine. Land trusts that hold older
easements, however, run the risk of conferring a substantial private
benefit by amending the easement in this situation even though the
same benefit would be permissible under other easements. Amending
the conservation easement to bring the easement up to current
drafting standards—as long as the amendment does not negatively
impact the conservation value of the land—should not violate the
private benefit doctrine.

168. See supra Part III.A.
169. See Anderson & Cosgrove, supra note 9, at 11–12 (noting that rural enterprise clauses
generally take one of two approaches to permitting “diversification of the farm business”—they
either “[a]llow the rural enterprise as long as it is a subordinate business to the farming
operation,” or they allow the enterprise “to operate within the farm building envelope”);
Bradley, supra note 1, at 27 (“[The Vermont Land Trust’s] easements now include a ‘New
Technologies’ clause, which allows the land trust to approve the use of a technological advance,
when it does not damage the conservation purpose of the easement.”).
170. This provision would not violate the private benefit doctrine because the benefit had
already been negotiated into the conservation easement and thus was an unavoidable benefit
created as part of the overall charitable pursuit of conserving land. See supra note 167.
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D. Public Benefits from Neutral-Impact Amendments
Although not commonly framed this way, neutral-impact
amendments that help a farm remain in production provide a
significant public benefit. Although research in this area is still
developing, the theory is that a public benefit is created when
171
competing land uses are balanced with each other. Working lands,
172
including farmlands, are part of this balance. Under this theory,
allowing conserved farmland to evolve and remain productive
without negatively impacting the conservation value of the land
provides a public benefit because it ensures that a state or locality
173
retains a good mix and balance of land uses.
As communities evolve and as land resources become
increasingly scarce, land planning will become even more critical.
Cities, states, and even the country, will need to determine the correct
balance of land uses to best meet a variety of needs. Unfortunately,
farmland is particularly prone to development pressures: the land is
174
flat, has good drainage, and is well-suited to development.
Preserving farmland is crucial—farms provide food and fiber for the
nation, agriculture employs 17 percent of the labor force, and wellmanaged farms protect the environment and provide other natural
175
goods and services. Preservation efforts such as conservation
easements are a key part of providing a public good: sustaining the
176
correct balance of farmland and developed land.
Neutral-impact amendments can help keep farmland in
production, thus helping to maintain the fragile balance between new
development and working lands. An amendment that helps a farmer
keep the land in production ensures that an appropriate mix of land
uses will be maintained—a public good itself—while still keeping the
conservation value of the land intact. Without a neutral-impact
amendment that benefits the farmer, a farm may no longer be able to

171. Interview with Bradford S. Gentry, Professor of Practice, Yale Sch. of Forestry &
Envtl. Studies, in Cheshire, Conn. (Nov. 23, 2011).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Todd W. Daloz, Farm Preservation: A Vermont Land-Use Perspective, 12 VT. J. ENVTL.
L. 427, 431–32 (2011).
175. Farmland Protection, AM. FARMLAND TRUST, http://farmland.org/programs/
protection/default.asp (last visited Mar. 6, 2013).
176. Other farmland-protection tools include agricultural zoning, agricultural districts,
purchase of development rights, and use-value assessments. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Beyond
Fairness: What Really Works To Protect Farmland, 21 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 163, 166–69 (2007).
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remain in production, which would remove the land from productive
use and thus disrupt the balance of land uses. If, however, the private
benefit doctrine did not apply to neutral-impact amendments, the
land trust could maintain the private benefit that the conservation
easement granted to the farmer, which would allow the farmer to
keep the land in production and serve the public good of balanced
177
land uses.
E. Encouraging Greater Use of Conservation Easements
Conservation easements are often criticized for not being flexible
178
enough, and many farmers are loath to add more restrictions to
their land use. Allowing a land trust to approve neutral-impact
amendments that benefit the productivity of the farm gives the land
trust additional flexibility within the easement. This added flexibility
might encourage other farmers and landowners to donate or sell a
conservation easement on their property when they otherwise might
not have. A private benefit doctrine that sanctions the flexibility that
neutral conservation impact amendments offer, therefore, might
incentivize conservation through working-land easements in a way
that could drastically outweigh the private benefits that these
amendments create for any individual farmers.
CONCLUSION
The application of the private benefit doctrine to farmland and
working-land conservation easements illustrates how law can create
undesirable and unexpected outcomes when applied to a specific
situation. When examined separately, both the private benefit
doctrine and neutral-impact amendments are useful and desirable. At
its core, the private benefit doctrine is designed to prevent abuses of
tax-exempt status and successfully does so in the case of amendments
that have a negative impact on an easement’s conservation value.
Neutral-impact amendments, however, allow a farmer to adjust to
177. Interesting questions arise as to whether the preservation of farmland itself should be
considered a charitable purpose under the IRS guidelines. Given the enormity of this question
and the variety of farms throughout the nation, these questions are best saved for exploration in
another paper.
178. See generally Adena R. Rissman, Evaluating Conservation Effectiveness and Adaptation
in Dynamic Landscapes, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145 (2011) (positing adaptive easements
as a more flexible option than easements currently in use); Greene, supra note 12 (advocating
for dynamic easements that adapt to changing conditions as opposed to more static conservation
easements).
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changing technologies and circumstances without harming the
conservation value of the land. Yet, as the legal rule stands, a land
trust risks losing its tax-exempt status under the private benefit
doctrine if it approves a neutral-impact amendment, such as one that
would allow a farmer to put an antenna inside a silo or increase the
size of the farming operation. This scenario makes little sense. Why
prohibit an amendment that advances one of the stated goals of the
easement and that does not harm the easement’s other stated goal?
Conservation land trusts should not run the risk of losing their
charitable status if they approve a neutral-impact amendment. To
remedy this unfortunate outcome, the IRS should rule that the
private benefit doctrine does not apply to neutral-impact
amendments. The IRS has already bestowed its approval on workingland easements that allow farmers, land trusts, and communities to
work together to preserve farms and conserve the environment.
These parties, therefore, should also be given flexibility to continue to
work the land, as long as this flexibility does not come at the expense
of the conservation purpose itself. Neutral-impact amendments allow
a land trust and a farmer to strike this balance.

